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1. Introduction 
 
There are a number of reasons why these elections are crucial both for Ukraine and for 
EU-Ukraine relations. 
 
First, the forthcoming presidential elections represent perhaps the greatest challenge for 
Ukrainian democracy so far. This is because they are taking place in the context of an 
ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Ukraine. The results of these 
presidential elections are crucial in that there is reason to suppose that the victory of one 
of the main candidates, Viktor Yushchenko would lead to a reversal of this deterioration 
while the victory of the other, Viktor Yanukhovych, may result in its further 
intensification. In other words, the conduct and result of these elections will provide a 
strong indicator as to the extent to which Ukraine is likely to adhere to the values of 
democracy, the rule of law and support for human rights in the forthcoming years. 
 
Secondly, the divergent political visions of Ukraine’s future adopted by the two main 
contenders have significant and profound implications both for Ukraine as a nation-state 
and its relationship with the EU: Mr Yanukovych is standing on a platform of continuity, 
including the prevailing style of governance; Mr Yushchenko stands for change and an 
intensification of Ukraine’s efforts to integrate with the EU. Most importantly, these 
divergent platforms imply that the pace of domestic reforms will depend on which 
candidate wins.    
 
Thirdly, the very fact that there exists a real choice for electors between two credible 
contenders, is a rarity in member states of the CIS, countries in which the propensity for 
incumbents to prolong their presidency or to designate a successor, is wide-spread. In 
contrast to elections in some of the CIS states in which the victor is known well in 
advance, it still remains to be seen who will be the eventual winner of the Ukrainian 
presidential elections. This is because firstly, the opposition forces in Ukraine remain 
strong, and, secondly, because there is real competition for power between the forces 
which represent the authorities and the opposition. This is untypical for countries of the 
CIS. And it is because of this ‘unusual’ phenomenon, that these elections, despite the 
known violations, have the potential for becoming an exemplar for other states in the 
region. In this key regard, the Ukrainian elections offer the EU the opportunity to 
promote European values in Ukraine as means of extending its influence throughout the 
CIS region. 
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2. The Pre-electoral Situation in Ukraine 
 
The presidential election campaign started in Ukraine on July 4, 2004 in accord with the 
newly adopted electoral law. The actual date of the elections is October 31. If no 
candidate achieves the 50% threshold necessary for success in the first round, a second 
round is scheduled for November 21.  
 
A total of 23 candidates is currently registered as official contenders for presidency, 
almost the double the number of the previous presidential elections in 1999. However, 
among 23 candidates, only 4 are credible contenders (1) Viktor Yushchenko, former prime 
-minister and leader of the biggest opposition faction in the parliament „Our Ukraine”; 2) 
Viktor Yanukovich, the current primer minister; 3) Oleksandr Moroz, the leader of the 
Socialist party of Ukraine and 4) Petro Symonenko, the leader of the Communist party of 
Ukraine. These four effectively represent the whole political spectrum in Ukraine (the 
party of power [Yanukovych], right-centrist democratic opposition [Yushchenko], left-
centrist opposition [Moroz], radical leftists [Symonenko]).  
 
Of the four, just two have a realistic chance of winning: Mr Yushchenko (with an opinion 
poll rating of 33% as of late September) and Mr Yanukovych (with an opinion poll rating 
of 27%). The remaining 19 candidates represent small, often marginal political groups 
and parties; indeed, some of them established themselves as political figures only at the 
start of the campaign for reasons which will be discussed below.  
 
A victory for Mr Yushchenko or Mr Yanukhovych in the first round is highly improbable, 
as neither candidate is likely to gain more than 50 per cent of the votes. Thus, a second 
round is virtually guaranteed. 
 
In legislative terms, the electoral legislation in place for the current elections is an 
improvement on that in previous elections in a number of key regards. Firstly, all polling 
commissions at the local and regional levels were formed according to submissions made 
by registered candidates. Secondly, it is illegal for local and governmental authorities to 
interfere in the formation of electoral commissions. Thirdly, the new law prohibits the 
Central Electoral Commission or local court from cancelling the registration of the 
candidates (this right is reserved for the Supreme Court). Finally, the law guarantees 
contenders equal access to prime time public TV channels. 
 
At the same time, the new law still suffers from some deficiencies. Above all, it lacks 
provisions which would allow NGO domestic representatives to send observers to polling 
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stations. As things stand, only the candidates, the media and international organisations 
are allowed to do so.  
 
But the key problem lies not in the legislation but in its implementation. Independent 
observers and the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, a leading NGO, have monitored the 
campaign and have noted the following violations:  
 
• Governmental interference in the election process and evidence of 
‘administrative pressure’. Governmental bodies have taken an active part in the 
campaign, despite it being strictly prohibited by law. Officials of central and 
regional authorities openly work for the ‘official’ candidate, Mr Yanukovych.  A 
noteworthy feature has been the direct use of law enforcement bodies against 
the opposition press and citizens involved in the campaign.  
• Discrimination in the media. On the basis of ongoing monitoring it is clear that 
central national-wide TV channels are blatantly biased in favour of the ‘official’ 
candidate in a variety of ways. According to the monitoring data, Mr 
Yanunkovych receives more TV coverage than all of the other candidates do 
collectively. In addition, the coverage of his activities as Prime Minister is 
overwhelmingly positive, in contrast to that of Mr Yushchenko, which receives 
almost exclusively critical coverage. 
• The ‘technical candidates’ problem. Among the 23 contenders there are at least 
15 who have not actually conducted a campaign in pursuit of the presidency. 
Instead, it appears that they have merely offered technical support for the ‘big’ 
candidates. For example, these pseudo-candidates have been able to influence 
the composition of polling commissions at different levels. As observers suggest 
that 12-13 of these technical candidates work for Mr Yanukovych, in practice, he 
would appear to control a significant number of commissions.  
 
In addition, it is also anticipated that specific strategies to influence the outcome of the 
elections will be employed by the supporters of the ‘official’ candidate on election day 
itself.  
 
• Lists of the voters. There is still no nation-wide register of voters which means 
that the system is open to a wide range of abuse. For example, in all previous 
elections there was evidence of the dead ‘voting’, double voting, and people 
deliberately omitted from the list. 
• Polling commissions’ capabilities. Sometime commission members are not 
properly trained for their work. Some commission professionals have refused to 
take part in the elections through fear. There is also a possibility that some 
commission members may not turn up at polling stations on the day of vote, 
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which may mean that in certain constituencies the results may be declared 
invalid. Western Ukraine is especially vulnerable in this regard, as it is where the 
opposition candidate, Mr Yushchenko is most likely to gain an absolute majority. 
• Voting abroad. 3-5 million Ukrainians work abroad. There is no mechanism in 
place either for the observation of the voting process or for ballot counting. This 
is likely to be a particularly pronounced issue in Russia, a country which has 
expressed a clear preference for the ‘official’ candidate. In the absence of a 
legitimate list of voters, technically, there is nothing to prevent huge numbers of 
votes being added surreptitiously with no means of verifying their validity.  
  
3. The Implications of a Yanukovych or Yushchenko Presidency 
 
3.1. Prospects for Domestic Reforms 
 
A Yushchenko victory 
 
A Yushchenko victory certainly carries the promise of change owing to his track record as 
reformist established during his short tenure as prime minister in 2000.  
 
At one level, because of the power of the presidency in Ukraine, which carries 
considerable constitutional weight, the prospect for reform under Mr Yushchenko is very 
bright. Indeed, it is precisely because of the fact that the presidency is such a powerful 
institution, and so fearful are they of a Yushchenko victory, that pro-Kuchma forces have 
tried (and failed) to push through last minute constitutional change to limit the powers of 
future presidents.  
 
But even a pro-reform president like Mr Yushchenko will face formidable challenges in 
introducing political and economic reforms. At the very outset he will be faced with the 
impediments presented by well-entrenched vested interests (including those within his 
own team), bureaucratic inertia and widespread corruption. He will also need to become 
much more decisive in his management style and will be required to co-operate with 
some of the oligarchs to prevent the formation of an overwhelmingly powerful bloc 
against him. At the same time he will need the support of allies outside Ukraine to help 
implement reforms. In particular, he will look to the EU to support him.   
 
A Yanukovych victory 
 
Mr Yanukovych, the candidate favoured by Mr Kuchma and many oligarchs, is to a certain 
extent seen by them as a ‘lesser evil’ than Mr Yushchenko, who they see as a direct threat 
to their interests. Mr Yanukhovych is ‘one of their own’, notwithstanding the fact that his 
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allegiance remains in doubt. This is because he seems to primarily be a representative of 
the Donbas region, a major industrial centre in Eastern Ukraine, rather than a propagator 
of pan-Ukrainian business interests.  
 
In line with Mr Kuchma’s chosen strategy of arbiter between various interests groups, Mr 
Yanukovych is likely to maintain the uneasy peace between the various regional elites. 
However, his perceived allegiance to the Donbas leaves other regional groupings 
distrustful of him (but even more distrustful of Mr Yushchenko). Should his ‘balancing act’ 
fail, it would be unsurprising if he were to resort to harsher, unconstitutional methods to 
suppress potential political and business opponents.  
 
Society 
 
In electoral terms Ukraine is split along regional lines which is likely to be reflected in the 
voting patterns for the two main candidates. (This is not to imply that these political 
divisions could be transformed into a separatist movement). This is because, firstly, there 
is simply no one single fault line dividing the country. Secondly, the Ukrainian public is 
politically apathetic and difficult to mobilise, despite the fact that a significant proportion 
believes that things are not developing favourably in the country. Thirdly, regional 
diversity – visible in diverse political preferences and geopolitical outlook – will continue 
to prevent the emergence of a consensus on decisions regarding pivotal policy choices 
facing the country. Crucially, this militates against a rapid implementation of the reform 
process. 
 
3.2. Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Following the Elections 
 
Despite some wavering, under President Kuchma, Ukraine has tried to lock itself into a 
pro-European orientation by declaring EU membership as a long-term strategic objective. 
In 2002, the ambition to seek NATO membership was also announced. Yet in line with its 
multi-vectored policy, Ukraine has sought to maintain its ‘special’ ties with Russia.  
Neither of the current front-runners in the electoral campaign is expected to radically 
change the country’s geopolitical orientation that is, pro-Europeanism allied to 
cooperation with Russia. Nevertheless, the nuances of the policies of each of the 
candidates expose significant differences. A Yushchenko victory would ensure improved 
relations with the European Union and an end to Ukraine’s (and more particularly, 
President Kuchma’s) effective isolation from the West. In contrast, Mr Yanukhovych has 
already implied that stronger ties with Russia are on the cards as is an abandonment of 
Ukraine’s ambition for membership of the EU in the short term.  
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Ukraine and Russia 
 
While neither candidate is anti-Russian, Russia favours a Yanukovych presidency because 
it sees him as the best protector of its interests in Ukraine. However, it is likely that Mr 
Yanukovych may be a less dependable ally than expected. This is because the business 
groups he is affiliated with, in particular the metallurgic industry, have international 
ambitions. In addition, the importance of the Russian market has declined since the mid-
1990s and after the 2004 EU enlargement, the Union is now the biggest market for 
Ukrainian goods (although Russia remains the biggest source of Ukrainian imports). 
Undoubtedly, there are business sectors interested in better access to the Russian market. 
These forces are behind Ukraine’s participation in the Common Economic Space with 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. But Ukraine, even under Mr Yanukovych is likely to 
oppose Russian ambitions to entangle Ukraine in a CIS-based alternative to the EU. 
 
At the least, Mr Yanukovych is likely to maintain the political and economic status quo 
regarding Russia. He is also likely to continue a ‘pragmatic’ policy characterised by non-
transparent, ad hoc decision-making often driven by particular interests of sections of the 
ruling elites and is unlikely to improve democratic standards in Ukraine or introduce 
greater transparency into the economic decision-making. This will suit Russia’s plans for 
Ukraine insofar as such a presidency will alienate Mr Yanukovych from the West.  
 
Mr Yushchenko has made great efforts to change his image of being anti-Russian both in 
Ukraine and in Russia, though without much success. He is careful to avoid an openly 
anti-Russian policy not only because of Ukraine’s dependency on energy resources, but 
also because of the undesirability of alienating the pro-Russian constituency in Eastern 
and Southern Ukraine. His will, however, apply sound economic logic to relations with 
Russia.  
 
Ukraine’s ‘European Choice’ and the EU  
 
Up till now, Ukraine has lacked the determination or will to embark on painful domestic 
reforms, despite the fact European integration is seen as desirable by the population at 
large. However, Mr Yanukovych and Mr Yushchenko differ in their European objectives 
meaning that the opportunities for the EU to promote reforms in Ukraine will depend on 
which of the two candidates prevails. 
 
Mr Yanukovych appears to want to distance himself from the EU, at least in the short-
term. By changing the emphasis from membership of the European Union to ‘short-term 
practical co-operation agreement’, he apears to be seeking to release himself from the 
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economic and political commitments that come with membership aspirations. The move 
can also be seen as pre-emptive. By reducing Ukraine's aspirations for EU membership, Mr 
Yanukovych wants to simultaneously reduce the leverage of the EU in the event of his 
coming to power: any criticisms the EU might have about his potential ‘victory’ can be 
more easily portrayed as interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. 
 
Instead, Mr Yanukovych, is seeking to prioritise the economic aspects of co-operation 
with the EU, over goals such as membership. He will thus downplay any criticisms of 
breaches of democratic standards and challenge any threats to the political and economic 
status quo in Ukraine. However, should any authoritarian tendencies come to the fore 
during his presidency, opposition groups will look up to the European institutions to 
defend democratic standards. Mr Yanukovych will continue to promote Ukraine’s 
accession to the WTO, as the lack of membership is now constraining Ukraine’s fast 
growing economy.  
 
It remains to be seen what stance Mr Yanukovych will adopt regarding NATO. He will find 
it difficult to bring to a halt the military reform process instigated by the (former) Minster 
of Defence, Yevhen Marchuk. But he is unlikely to be as apparently supportive as Mr 
Kuchma used to be (in June 2004, he appeared to renege on his commitment to support 
Ukraine’s membership of NATO, probably in response to pressure from Russia.) As with 
the EU, the quality of Ukraine-NATO relations will be a corollary of the prevailing 
democratic standards in Ukraine. 
 
Mr Yushchenko will seek closer ties with the EU both to increase the attractiveness of the 
European choice and to generate support for domestic reforms. At present, the focus on 
the economic and technocratic aspects of co-operation does not elicit much enthusiasm 
for EU policy prescriptions in Ukraine. The appeal of the economic incentives of the ENP 
may increase as the reform process gains momentum, though only to business sectors 
with an interest in the EU market. Mr Yushchenko will need to transform the European 
choice into a political as well as an economic project if it is to become a key driver for 
reform.  
 
This is not an easy task. At present, the preparation of the EU Action Plan for Ukraine is 
virtually unknown outside a narrow group of politicians and experts in Ukraine. Unless it 
is popularised it will remain a technocratic document limiting its usefulness in domestic 
debates and policy making.  
 
Mr Yushchenko will support a more prominent role for the EU in Ukraine. To do so, he 
will need to engage Ukraine’s political class and citizens, primarily by convincing the 
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electorate that Ukraine is ‘wanted in Europe’ and mitigate a strong sense of exclusion 
prevailing in Ukraine. To achieve this, he will insist on a European perspective for Ukraine. 
 
4. Recommendations 
 
• Prior to the elections, the EU should inform (officially and/or unofficially) the 
Ukrainian authorities that it will publish an extensive evaluation of the elections 
and that the results of the evaluation will be decisive for future political and 
economic EU-Ukraine relations.  
 
• The period between the two rounds of elections (three weeks) will be crucial as 
the campaign will boil down to a battle between two candidates: Mr Yanukovych 
and Mr Yushchenko. With so much at stake for the forces which Mr Yanukovych 
represents, the limits to which he/they are prepared to go in pursuit of victory 
remains unknown. Therefore, the EU (European Parliament) should be acutely 
sensitive to any violations, irrespective at which stage they occur, and be ready 
to act immediately and directly.  
 
• The EU should prepare an extensive assessment of the presidential elections 
following the second round. The report should be ready no later than December 
2004. 
 
• Even though negotiations have been completed at the expert level, the EU 
should not sign the Action Plan between the EU and Ukraine prior to the second 
round of presidential elections. The Action Plan should be signed by the new 
president. 
 
• In the event of a Yushchenko victory the EU should establish a special donors` 
meeting, similar to the action taken in support for Georgia, to promote Ukrainian 
reforms. Preparations for this meeting should be underway even before 
presidential elections take place. 
 
• In the event of a Yanukovych victory the EU will need to wait to determine the 
extent to which a further deterioration in democratic standards is a real danger. 
In the event of a deterioration in democratic values, the EU will need to 
reappraise its interaction with Ukraine. This should not mean the isolation of 
Ukraine. Rather it should mean increased support for the pro-reform 
constituency in Ukraine, by targeting business, bureaucracy, youth, and the third 
sector. 
 
